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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the economic and legal aspects of
the involvement of privately owned vessels from the
Chesapeake Bay region in maritime warfare from their first
use through the Revolution.
The goals of the nation-state in instituting
privateering are outlined and military, social, and economic
goals are shown to be interrelated.
The blurred distinction between piracy and privateering
is viewed as a result of the amount of the prize-ship's
value claimed by the government as court fees and royal
droit.
Examples of privateers and prizes through the Seven
Years' War are given, illustrating the cyclical nature of
privateering during a conflict.
American resources on the
eve of the Revolution, including the types of vessels used
in privateering, are discussed.
The average values of recorded prizes taken by
Chesapeake privateers during the American Revolution and the
division of prize money among crews are combined and
compared to merchant seamen's wages.
Given a successful
voyage, privateering held a three-to-one economic advantage
for the common sailor over merchant service.
Relative risks
of the professions are weighed with little to choose between
the t w o .
The regulation of privateering is traced from the
earliest English admiralty courts, through the colonial
vice-admiralty system.
Conflicts between non-jury admiralty
law and English common law led ultimately/to colonial
grievances concerning abridgement of right to jury trial.
J

American efforts during the Revolution to redress this
situation by using juries in admiralty prize cases proved
abortive.
Eventually, all American admiralty courts
reverted to non-jury trials.
The first federal court was
convened to try interstate prize cases and admiralty
appeals.
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PRIVATEERING IN THE COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE

INTRODUCTION
Privateering developed as a means for nation-states to
fulfill three interrelated goals.

The legitimization of

piracy through state regulation was intended to:

1) co-opt

pirates who were indiscriminately draining national
economies for individual gain,

2) provide a cheap means to

deplete an enemy's maritime wealth, and 3) increase national
wealth through a governmental claim to a share of the value
of captured commerce.

The common factor tying the three

goals together was economic.

From the simple sailor to

state policy-makers, economic considerations were the
driving forces behind privateering.

Unfortunately,

the

economic advantages could only be realized during a period
of formal armed conflict.

While the second goal became

irrelevant in peacetime, the first and third were
continually active factors in policy formation and would
often weigh in declarations of war.
The destruction of commercial shipping was second
nature to American seamen by the time of the Revolution
because of the long tradition of privateering in the New
World.

The granting of "letters of marque and reprisal,"

which commissioned privately-owned ships to prey upon
vessels and property of an enemy state, had been used since
the days of Drake.

During the American Revolution it was
2

3
the predominant manifestation of colonial sea power, having
a far greater impact on British shipping than the few ships
of Paul Jones's Continental navy.
While never as prevalent as in New England,
privateering in the Chesapeake was extremely important to
the economy of that maritime region.

When virtually all

other forms of economic stimulus were cut off by blockade,
privateering became the one investment available to
Chesapeake merchants.

It was also the only source of

employment for the mariners of the region.

This group (and

the social effects of privateering) cannot be separated from
society as a whole because many landsmen were attracted to
the sea for the first time as privateers.

The political,

economic, and social forces drawing these men into the
dangers of the profession can be approached through the
questions of who became privateers and why they did so.

The

answers provide a clearer picture of the social context in
which they lived.
Beyond the military, social, and economic effects of
privateering,

important legal issues include international

law and the role of commerce destruction in the escalation
of disputes into outright warfare, admiralty law (which
determined the distribution of prize vessels and goods), and
constitutional law.

The latter involved a debate over the

sovereignty of the State of Virginia in the taxation of
prizes and the creation of the first federal court of
appeals to review admiralty cases.

CHAPTER I
THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATEERING
Considering the impact of privateering on the
eighteenth-century Chesapeake, it is not particularly well
studied.

At least one of the reasons for this is the

understandable confusion between piracy and privateering.
While privateers were subject to regulations concerning the
nationality and type of vessel they could take and the
admiralty court's condemnation of the capture as a legal
prize, it was common for these legalities to be ignored,
especially at the end of a war when increased piracy
accompanied the legal termination of privateering.

Instead

of returning to life on land or as merchant seamen, many
privateers whose livelihood had been taken away by peace
crossed the fine line into piracy, attacking vessels
regardless of nationality.^
The famous case of Captain Kidd illustrates the
confusion.

He sailed from Plymouth, England in 1696 with a

letter of marque, one-tenth of his profits to go to the
crown.

Evidently, he considered this too large a cut, for

he cruised the Indian Ocean for the next three years
plundering the vessels of any nation.

His subsequent

capture in Boston and trial and execution in England will
forever blur the distinction between piracy and
4

5
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privateering.

Kidd notwithstanding, the vast majority of

privateers did not become pirates and obeyed all
regulations.^
One of the motivations toward piracy was the high
percentage of the value of privateers' prizes which went to
the officers of the courts.

As of 1708 the judge's fee was

7 percent, the advocate general's 5 percent, the marshal
took 1.5 percent, and the appraiser and vendue master each
received 2.5 percent.

Some courts began remitting fees when

they recognized that inflated court costs were increasing
the temptation to turn pirate or to send prizes to less
4. 4
expensive courts.

The primary reason for a lack of privateers or for
those commissioned to turn pirate was the share of a prize
claimed by the crown.

The beginning of each conflict

required the renewal or modification of the droit
legislation.

Before 1702 the royal droit was one-tenth the

value of the prize.

In 170 2 a need for more revenue or a

decision that privateers were not needed in great numbers
led to the droit's being raised to one-fifth.
1705 it was raised to one-third.

Likewise in

Including customs duties

and court charges, the government's share could total as
much as 60 percent of the value of the prize.
In 1708, with Queen Anne's War, the droit was waived
completely.

The total prize value to be divided between the

owners, captain, and crew of a privateer was thus
immediately increased by one-half.

With Keynesian logic,

6
the third economic goal of increasing the national wealth
was forsaken in favor of the second, that of depleting the
enemy's wealth, as the incentive to fit out vessels as
privateers and to actually deliver any prizes to an
g
admiralty court was strengthened.
By 1715 the excessive
court costs were addressed by royal instructions sent to
Virginia which limited the charges levied by the officers of
7
the colony's admiralty courts to ten pounds per prize.
On August 20, 1739, on the eve of King George's War,
William Byrd II wrote to Sir Robert Walpole urging the crown
to again waive its droit.

He also argued against the

reestablishment of a Prize Office, citing the "exorbitant
fees" charged by the "Vultures which hovered for prey about
the Office" during the reign of King William.

Byrd then

charged some politicians with being apprehensive about the
encouragement of privateering against Spain lest they bring
the French "upon our backs."

Byrd hoped that this would

happen, because "if they do not, their Privateers both in
Europe, and America will take Spanish Commissions, & so
annoy our commerce as much, as if we were in actual War with
them."

He ended his correspondence with the exhortation to
g

"trust altogether to our Wooden Walls."

Accordingly,

Parliament enacted legislation in 1740 that waived the droit
except for the normal customs and duties and the fees of the
judges and officers of the prize courts.

9

From King

George's War through the Revolution the total cost of
disposing of a prize was about 10 percent of its v a l u e . ^

7
At the time Byrd was writing, the activities of the
privateers themselves were increasing international tension
to the point of war.

In 1739 the Spanish refused to

reimburse the British £95,000 for vessels "unjustly seized."
Governor William Gooch of Virginia was therefore authorized
to grant commissions of marque and reprisal against the
Spanish in the West I n d i e s . ^

On June 10, 1741 the Virginia

Council authorized the impressment of two vessels to be
outfitted as private sloops of war to defend the colony from
Spanish privateers rumored to be in the area.

These

colony-sponsored privateers were to be commissioned for
three months and to carry sixty-to-seventy men each.

The

sailors were to be paid forty shillings per month and the
owners of the vessels compensated at the rate of fourteen
shillings per ton burthen per month.

12

On September 26, 1745 the Virginia Gazette carried an
advertisement announcing the completion in Norfolk of the
Earl of Stair, a snow privateer of 150 tons burthen, with
eighteen carriage and thirty swivel guns (large
blunderbuss-type weapons mounted in swivels on the bulwarks
and mast tops and used against the enemy crew at short
range), and a crew of 150.

13

It is significant that this

was a new vessel built as a privateer, while the vast
majority of such vessels were modified merchantmen.
In the same year a French prize, the Elizabeth, was
condemned by the admiralty court in Williamsburg.

Her cargo

included 282 hogsheads of sugar, 4,000-5,000 weight of

8
indigo and a parcel of choice mahogany planks.

The prize

money was shared by two privateers who were sailing in
consort,

for any vessel within sight of the prize at the

time of its capture was entitled to a share under admiralty
law.

14

Presumably, even the appearance of another vessel

over the horizon would influence the surrender of the prize.
One of the responsibilities of the prize court was to
determine the percentage of influence and the corresponding
share due each vessel.
Also in 1745, American privateers were beginning to
cruise the waters of the West Indies and to send their
prizes into ports there.

A Spanish ship worth £100,000 was

sent to Jamaica, and a Swedish ship carrying 300,000 pieces
of eight was taken by the privateer sloop Henry and sent to
Barbados in that year.

15

The use of the West Indies as a

rich cruising territory became almost as important as during
the American Revolution, when prizes were sent to French and
Dutch ports there.
In April 1745 the privateer Raleigh sent a French prize
valued at £5,000 into St. K i t t ' s . ^

However, a possible

drop in the profitability of privateering toward the end of
King George's War is suggested by the advertisement for sale
of both Raleigh and Earl of Stair m

August,

1746.

only one prize appears in the Virginia Gazette
1745.

18

17

Also,

after

As enemy merchant shipping was captured in the

first months of war, insurance costs would rise and
merchants would be more reluctant to send their ships to

9
sea.

It seems likely, then, that the number of possible

prize ships dropped off considerably after the first year of
war and subsequent privateering cruises took fewer prizes
and were less profitable. 19
Prior to the outbreak of the Seven Years' War the
presence of privateers again strained international
relations.

In 1755 a letter from London, reprinted in the

Virginia Gazette, claimed that French privateers would be
met by the same from England and that such proceedings might
be looked upon as open hostilities, occasioning a "Rupture
between the principal Powers."

20

The rupture occurred, but

French privateers were met with few from the Chaespeake
during the Seven Years' War.
in the Gazette for 1756-63.

Prizes are scarcely mentioned
One privateer was advertised as

fitting out for sea in the summer of 1756.

Four prizes were

listed, three taken in 1757, quite early in the war;

the

fourth details a second distribution of prize money in 1766,
the capture date is not given.

21

This dearth of prizes notwithstanding, by the eve of the
Revolution the Americans had the experience and resources
necessary to mount a successful privateering campaign.
One-third of all vessels in British trade at the time were
American-built.

The same proportion of British seamen were

American, many of whom had seen action on colonial
privateers or naval vessels.

22

A few privateers were built for the job.

Most,

however, were hastily converted from merchant ships to

10
capitalize on the opportunity for a different kind of
profit.

Colonial merchant vessels were particularly

well-suited to such conversion.

The avoidance of British

duties through smuggling was widespread before the
Revolution.

While smuggling honed American seamanship

skills useful in privateering, American shipbuilders began
to sacrifice cargo capacity for the speed needed to outrun
the revenue cutters.

American merchant vessel hulls were

V-shaped rather than the traditional U-shape, and carried
oversized masts to carry extra sails.

23

Chesapeake shipyards had built 12.5 percent of the
total tonnage of shipping m

the colonies by 1769.

24

Among

these were found the types of vessels most useful and
successful in privateering.

Between 1756 and 1775

vessels were built in Maryland.
largest group of these - 111.

386

Schooners represented the
There were 98 ship-rigged

vessels, 74 sloops, 66 brigs, and 37 snows.

The Virginia

Gazette carried advertisements for 100 Virginia-built
vessels between 1736 and 1766.
were brigs,

20 were schooners,

Of these,

38 were sloops,

24

12 were snows, and 6 were

..
25
ships.
A ship was a three-masted,

square-rigged vessel up to

250 tons burthen, carrying up to 100 hands.

It was not the

most desirable vessel because its square-rig required too
many crewmen to handle and it was not as nimble as a
fore-and-aft rig.

An example was the Buckskin, out of

Maryland, with a crew of 100 and twenty-eight carriage guns,
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making her the largest privateer out of that colony.
The brig was a smaller two-masted vessel of square rig,
eighty of which were commissioned as privateers by Virginia
and Maryland.

An example is the Sturdy Beggar with a crew

of 80 and fourteen guns.

A popular variant was the

brigantine, which had a gaff-rigged fore-and-aft mainsail
replacing the brig's square mainsail.

Virginia and Maryland

also commissioned eighty brigantines during the Revolution.
The snow was a small brig with a trysail mast behind
the mainmast. It was not a particularly popular vessel.

A

sloop was a small single-masted vessel, handy and shallow of
draft with a removable centerboard,

it was popular for

evading heavier enemy ships in the shallow waters of the
Bay.

The Baltimore Hero sloop was just fifty tons

burthen.

26

Small galleys, barges, and whaleboats, known as

"spider chasers" were used in the more protected waters of
the Bay and its tributaries.

These could carry a light

carriage gun as well as swivels in the bow, and often four
or five boats would work in consort to take an anchored ship
of larger size.

27

The most popular type of vessel among Chesapeake
privateers was the topsail schooner; 40 percent of Maryland
commissions were for this type of ship.

28

Fore-and-aft

rigged on both masts, the schooner's sails could be trimmed
from the deck, and she could sail closer to the wind than
any square-rigger.

The schooner thus needed to make fewer

tacks when sailing to windward, and she had the agility to

12
come about quickly when the tack was made.

These qualities,

plus the ability to set a square main-topsail for additional
speed when running before the wind, often meant the
difference between a prize-winning cruise and coming home
empty-handed. The schooner Harlequin, with only six swivel
and no carriage guns and a crew of just twenty-one, was able
to take a £20,000 prize m

December 1776.

29

The topsail

schooner was the immediate ancestor of the Baltimore
Clipper, famous for its speed as a merchant vessel. The
average crew size for a topsail schooner privateer in the
mid-eighteenth century was fifty-four.

30

The division of prize money among the crew was made
according to an agreement signed by the owners, captain, and
each crew member.

The percentage retained by the owners

varied from one-third to one-half of the proceeds,

depending

on whether or not seaman were in demand and whether the
owners provisioned the vessel at their own expense rather
than on credit to be paid out of the prize funds.

A

surviving crew agreement of 1762 for the privateer Mars
provides that one-half of the prize money was to go to the
owners,

for they completely provisioned the ship.

was divided into shares as follows:

The rest

the captain received

six full shares; the lieutenants and master, three shares
each; captain's clerk, mates,

steward, prize-master,

gunner,

boatswain, carpenter, and cooper, two shares each; gunner’s
mate, boatswain's mate, doctor's mate, carpenter's mate, and
cooper's mate, one and one-half shares each. The doctor

13
received three shares plus an allowance to keep the medicine
chest filled.
each.

The remainder of the crew received one share

Provision was made for the shares of any man killed

to be paid to his executors, and those who lost a limb were
entitled to the equivalent of 600 pieces-of-eight at six
shillings each before the division of the prize money.

A

bonus of 40 pieces-of-eight was won by the crewman who first
sighted a vessel later taken as prize.

31

For the common seaman, then, the motivation toward
privateering was strongly, though not completely, economic.
His chances for profit rode solely on finding and capturing
prizes, but his risk involved not merely his livelihood but
his life and limbs.

The chances that a privateering voyage

was successful appear good.

Between two and three thousand

American privateers are estimated to have sailed during the
Revolution.

32

The records of the Virginia admiralty courts

were burned, but trial libels published in six other states
list over twenty-one hundred prizes.

33

Not all privateers

were as successful as the Enterprise of Baltimore which had
taken a total of eight prizes by the end of 1776, or the
Marquis Lafayette which took a single prize worth $350,000
m

1781.

34

Some were taken by the Royal Navy or run

aground, some fought pitched battles with British or Tory
privateers, or returned empty-handed, but the aspiring
privateersman could reasonably expect to share in at least
one prize.

35

The Virginia Gazette cites fifty-one prizes taken by

14
Virginia and Maryland privateers during the Revolution.

Of

these, thirteen were valued by estimate or by the actual
sale price of the condemned vessel and cargo.

The values

range between £2400 and £100,000, with an average prize
value of £21,600.

These figures do not, of course, take

into account prizes taken by Chesapeake privateers and sent
into ports in other colonies.

While it is presumed that

prizes would, if possible, be sent into the home port for
condemnation, this was not possible when the British fleet
closed the Bay.

Also, the French West Indies ports were

"crowded with cruisers and merchantmen belonging to these
states," and American prize agents sold many condemned
vessels there.

36

Given the incompleteness of the data,

then, the total value of the fifty-one prizes at just over
£1,100,000 is a conservative estimate.
Following the Mars agreement and taking the average
prize value of £21,600, the owners and crew would each share
£9,720

(allowing for 10 percent court costs).

Division of

the prize money among a fifty-four-man topsail schooner crew
would require seventy-nine shares, each of which would be
valued at about £123.
At the time of the American Revolution an able seaman
could make five pounds per month and an experienced mate
seven pounds m

a merchantman.

37

Over a seven-month period,

the average length of a cruise, a common privateer would
have made three and one-half times the pay of a merchant
sailor.

38

Balanced against this is the estimate that

15
one-half of all those actively engaged in privateering were
killed,

injured, or captured.

39

The life of a privateer was not much more hazardous
than a merchant seaman's, however,
shot at and captured.

for merchantmen were also

In fact, privateers took pains to

avoid situations which might lead to casualties.

Privateers

avoided gun duels because their great advantage in capturing
an enemy vessel was not their cannon, which could badly
damage a valuable prize.

They carried lighter cannon than a

warship of comparable size because they tended to be broad
in the beam.

Warships were built narrower in the beam at

the gun deck level to keep the weight of the heavy guns
centered.

The typical Chesapeake-built ship had the low

freeboard used in calm southern seas; a very heavy weight of
guns run out to leeward in a strong wind would have likely
driven the ports under.

A privateer was topheavy in spars

already and, in any case, her light timbers would not have
stood the recoil from heavy cannon.

40

Capturing a prize by fouling and boarding was not
favored by privateers either.

Boarding was a dangerous

procedure in the calmest of seas, collisions were
uncontrollable and spars and rigging (the bread and butter
of the privateer) could be fouled and lost.

It was not the

business of the privateersman to get himself killed in a
heroic charge across blood-spattered decks.

Rather, the

privateer used his superior manpower to wear down his
opponent in a long chase and overawe him with a few

16
well-placed near-misses into lowering his flag.

Merchantmen

were notoriously short-handed; owners were loath to pay for
more than the minimum eight crewmen per mast necessary to
sail a square-rigged vessel.

Thus, the privateer crew

generally held a five-or-six-to-one advantage over their
adversaries.

41

Merchant crews, exhausted by the constant

hard work of a long passage, would have been hard-pressed to
work a defensive gun or two and to continue to sail the
ship.
Large crews made for light work aboard privateers,

and

the fact that only a fraction of the crew was needed to work
the rigging and sails led the Continental Congress to spread
the wealth among non-seamen by requiring that one-third of
all crewmen be landsmen with no seagoing experience.

42

Apparently, the fresh air of a sea voyage, coupled with
financial opportunity, was too good to pass up.

Virginia

soon had to enact legislation forbidding the distribution of
prize money by admiralty courts to privateers whose crew
included known deserters from the state or Continental
armies, charging the owners a £500 fine.

43

In October 1775 Silas Deane, the American
representative in Paris, succinctly stated the economic
basis of privateering:

"At least Ten Thousand Seamen are

thrown out of employ... these with their owners...cannot
possibly long rest easy...their ships rotting and their
Families starving...they will pursue the only method in
their power of indemnifying themselves, and Reprisals will

17
be made."

44

This establishes the growth of privateering as

primarily defensive in nature, a reaction to the loss of
other means of survival.

The capitalist impulse to reap

windfall profits was balanced by high risk.
Because the Chesapeake was so easily blockaded, the
region's shipping was reduced by 75 percent by 1777.

45

By

1779 the merchants of Baltimore decided to lay up all of
their vessels due to British privateers.

46

A picture

emerges of the large fleets of merchantmen sitting at
anchor, unable to move their goods, until some owners
realized that the only way to save their investments was to
outfit them as privateers.

Not only were the ships idle,

but the capital to fit them out and the sailors to man them
were also.

A letter from a citizen of the British trade

port of Liverpool reprinted in the February 26, 1779
Virginia Gazette illustrates the case.

After claiming a

clear profit of £3,000 for each owner of the forty-seven
privateers sent out by the city, he wrote:

"The

privateering trade is the best trade going on at this time,
for we have but little other.

Half the people must have

been bankrupt, had it not been for the great success our
47
armed ships have met with. "

One month later, the total

profits of Liverpool's privateers (then numbered at
fifty-seven) was put at £1,200,000 sterling.

4R

The growth of privateering was probably cyclical during
any conflict.

The vast majority of prize citations in the

Virginia Gazette are for the year 1776, when British

18
merchant shipping was most vulnerable.

After suffering

large losses, British merchants would have laid up their
vessels as Baltimore's did and eventually turned to
privateering themselves.

Thus, the boom in Liverpool

privateering occurred in 1779.

By September of that year,

however, a British army official was quoted as saying that
privateering from the British islands was almost at an
end.

49

That this was true was due more to the lack of

potential American prizes than to an effective American
naval defense.

Military circumstances did have an effect on

economic cycles, however.

Chesapeake privateering ceased

during the British fleet's stay, but revived at a reduced
level with the arrival of the French.

50

It appears that the total profits of Chesapeake and
Liverpool privateers cancel each other out, and indeed this
was probably true of the total profits of the privateers of
each country.

51

On the smaller scale, however, the flow of

capital caused by privateering kept the otherwise stagnating
American economy and the ship owners, builders,
sailors, and admiralty judges alive.

riggers,

The case of Liverpool

notwithstanding, the British economy, not subject to
blockade, would have survived merely through the use of
convoys of merchant vessels.

British insurance rates rose

to 30 percent for vessels in convoy and 50 percent for those
sailing alone by 1776, but the losses would be made good.

52

For the Americans, under blockade, privateering became a
major method of bringing goods and capital into the country.

19
In this sense, it aided the Americans more than the British.
The question remains as to the significance of
privateering in the Revolution.

It is estimated that 58,400

Americans served on privateers during the war.

53

That the

British were reluctant to include them in prisoner exchanges
and shipped them to prison hulks in England indicates the
importance attributed to them.

54

Privateers themselves took

16,000 prisoners and well over $12 million worth of goods
and shipping.

55

Chesapeake-based privateers contributed

their share; of the 1,697 American privateers listed in the
Naval Records of the American Revolution, Virginia alone had
commissioned 64 by 1 7 8 3 . ^
All of these accomplishments were probably cancelled
out by British privateers and the presence of the Royal
Navy.

The real progress which privateering made toward the

American victory was in the disruption of the British line
of supply, the economic stimulus through both outlet for
investment and input of goods, and in showing the flag to
the world.

The British were undertaking an offensive land

campaign over a huge continent and thousands of miles from
home.

The fact that a shipment of musket flints did not

arrive on time may have had an impact far greater than the
value of the cargo in dollars and cents.

That France and

Spain could clearly see the little ships harassing the
British everywhere may have played a role equal to the
victory at Saratoga in convincing them of the Americans'
will to go the distance.
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CHAPTER II
THE REGULATION OF PRIVATEERING
The legislation and jurisprudence which governed
privateering can be viewed in terms of the three economic
goals of the nation-state.

The first, the subordination of

pirates to a national objective,

involved the legitimization

of privateering and its clear distinction from piracy.

This

distinction allowed the sponsoring state to offer legal
status to those who would restrict their captures to enemy
vessels and fulfill the requirements of the prize courts.
The advantages to the privateers of being legally recognized
rather than hunted outlaws were balanced against the
narrowed range of potential prizes,

the necessity of

returning the prize to a friendly port, the time and money
required by the court to condemn the prize as legal, and the
share of the prize claimed by the sponsoring government.

In

many cases the costs and benefits did not favor the legal
practice and the privateers reverted to piracy.

Laws were

also modified over time according to the perceived need of
the sponsoring country to encourage large numbers of
privateers by reducing the governmental claim to prizes.
The first step in the legitimization of privateering
was the assumption that the right of war is exclusive to the
sovereign^ state and the corollary that private citizens are
24
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under no legal obligation to weigh the justice of a war.
Thus, the private citizen could not lawfully commit hostile
acts, such as commerce raiding, except under the commission
of a sovereign nation, but could do so with a safe
conscience under such commission.

Laws formalizing these

assumptions were first passed by France, Spain, and England
in the fifteenth century.'*'
The right to seize hostile property in self-defence
eventually became regulated through the issuance of letters
of marque and reprisal.

These were originally intended for

merchants who were authorized to fit out privateers in
reprisal for specific losses to enemy vessels or debts owed
by enemy merchants.

Later, the reprisal reference was

forgotten and the term "letter of marque"

(or "mart") came

to be associated with armed merchantmen authorized to take
prizes they might encounter en route.

Technically,

letters

of marque were distinct from cruising privateers, but even
contemporaries used the term for both, as well as for the
2
actual commissions they carried.
The development of admiralty courts in England
pre-dated the codification of privateering.

The admiral as

fleet commander had administrative and disciplinary control
over those under his command, but until the second half of
the fourteenth century he had no judicial authority.

Port

or marine courts administered maritime law among merchants
and seamen.

A court of admiralty first appeared between

1340 and 1357 to deal with the many piratical acts which had

been charged against English vessels by foreign merchants.
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3

In 1357 the king-in-council refused to interfere with the
admiral's sentence in a prize case concerning captured
Portuguese property.

Precedent was thus set of admiralty

jurisdiction in prize cases and of appeal from the admiralty
court to the king m

council.

4

Almost from the beginning, a distinction developed
between English common law and admiralty law procedure,
which was based on foreign civil law which did not try by
jury.

The Black Book of the Admiralty,

of court practice,

a virtual handbook

substantiates this orientation for the

admiralty's jurisdiction in cases of piracy, royal fish,
navigational obstructions,

shipwreck and salvage,

mercantile and criminal cases.

shipping,

All of these areas had

previously been under the jurisdiction of the common law
courts.

There was, understandably,

a good deal of

opposition by these courts to giving up their jurisdictions,
as well as from citizens involved with the new admiralty
courts who claimed their rights under Magna Carta were being
violated.

In 1371 a petition to Parliament complained of

people being forced to answer charges in an admiral's court
without benefit of a common law jury.

5

In 1389 and 1391 Parliament attempted to distinguish
more precisely between admiralty and common law
jurisdiction.

The first statute commanded that the

admiralty not meddle in "anything done within the realm" but
only in "a thing done upon the sea."

The second provided
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that all contracts/ pleas, and quarrels rising within the
counties (land or sea) would be dealt with by the common law
system, and only death or mayhem upon ships at sea or at
anchor in great rivers would be adjudicable in admiralty
court.

These attempts to restrict the admiralty courts'

encroachment on the jurisdictions,

franchises, and profits

belonging to the king and the lower courts were largely
ignored because of the expeditious nature of the non-jury
admiralty courts.

Admiralty law had the further advantage

of using the process iji rem by which the plaintiff had a
double chance of satisfaction by litigating against both the
defendant and the vessel and cargo in question? if the
pirate was not caught, the vessel was impounded; if he was,
he could not divest himself of such property.

In 1450

Parliament finally imposed fines on those who continued to
. .
.
.
7
take civil suits to admiralty courts.
In 1536 Henry VIII created the office vice-admiral and
with it the jurisdiction of vice-admiralty courts.
Appointed for maritime counties, the vice-admirals of the
coast were commissaries under patents issued by the lord
high admiral.

They were to check the salvaging activities

of coastal inhabitants, arrest vessels and inventory the
cargoes of ships subject to litigation, examine witnesses
and execute sentences in cases of wreck, fisheries, and
local maritime business.

These offices,

seen mainly as

sources of profit for their holders, became the prototypes
for the American colonial vice-admiralty courts.

8
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In practice, the vice-admiral traveled his county,
holding court at various locations as cases arose.

At each

stop he would call a jury of twenty-four men from the ports
of the district.

This "grand jury" made presentments to the

vice-admiral of wrecks to be salvaged in the district,
dead men found, and
regulations.
suits.

of

of felonies committed or broken customs

A common court was also held to try civil

A deputy was provided for in the vice-admiralty

instructions in case the commissioner himself was not
familiar with the law.

The vice-admiral collected all

monies due the king and admiral accruing from flotsam and
jetsam, royal fish, and fines and fees taken in court.
Profits for the commissioner came from a share of fines,
fees and sale of flotsam.

These were quite small and varied

considerably from year to year.

The large,

sure profits for

the vice-admirals came from the sale of wrecks and pirate
ships and their goods.

Because of the inherent temptation,

all vice-admirals provided a bond to insure that they would
9
carry out their duties faithfully.
When Englishmen transplanted themselves in America,
they brought provision for admiralty jurisdiction.

The

charter for the Virginia Company provided for no special
court, but an admiral or vice-admiral was to be one of the
chief executive officials.

His duties were the protection

of the colony from attack by sea, the visitation of every
ship which called, and the protection of the company's
monopoly of trade by seizure of offending vessels.

The
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close relationship between privateering and the admiralty is
foretold by the case of Sir Samuel Argali, who, while
serving as both governor and admiral, took to privateering
against the Spanish under a commission from the Duke of
Savoy.

Prizes taken under such foreign commission would not

be upheld in British vice-admiralty courts, but it would
serve to keep him from hanging as a pirate.1^
Under the Charter of 1632, the Lord Proprietor of
Maryland held the title of High Admiral with the authority
to convene admiralty courts in his colony.'*'1

Such a court

was approved by the Assembly in 1638, but, as in Virginia,
admiralty laws were not in

general use.

The county or

general courts reviewed any such cases which arose without
reference to specialized admiralty precedents or
procedures.

12

In fact, the need for admiralty courts was so

small that when asked by the Lords Commissioners of
Plantations in 1671 what admiralty courts existed in
Virginia, Governor William Berkeley replied that such courts
were not needed because not one prize had been brought to
the state for condemnation in the last twenty-eight years.

13

Such a dearth of prize cases as Virginia exhibited would
definitely have put an English vice-admiralty court out of
business.

Although the 1638 Maryland law had required trial

by jury in all criminal cases in admiralty court, trial in
both civil and criminal cases in county or provincial court
was without jury except when required by either party.

14

This is remarkable considering both prior and subsequent
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vehemence in both England and the colonies over the
constitutional right to jury trial.
In 1660 a second struggle between common and civil law
saw the parliamentarians prevail over James I.

This victory

over civil law and the autocracy it upheld meant the
restriction of admiralty jurisdiction to little other than
prize cases m•

P
n ^ 15
England.

Admiralty courts had appeared in virtually all of the
colonies by the latter half of the seventeenth century, but
they were little used.

The king's brother, James, Duke of

York, was already serving as Lord High Admiral of England in
1661 when he received a special patent as Lord Admiral of
New England, Virginia, Bermuda, and Jamaica. The governor of
the latter received,

in turn, the first patent from James to

establish a colonial vice-admiralty court.

In Jamaica,

where piracy was the greatest problem, the court was used
mainly in cases of prize because the distinction between
privateering and piracy was particularly tenuous at this
t i m e .16
After 1689 all royal governors were appointed
vice-admirals and commissioned to oversee all maritime
matters of the crown.

They were to delegate this authority

through the appointment of judges of colonial vice-admiralty
courts.

17

however.

.
Authority was not exercised with any consistency,
Judicial powers for the most part continued to be

in the hands of the county and provincial courts.
The need for an invigorated admiralty court system on
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both sides of the Atlantic came in 1696 with the
codification of the Acts of Trade.

The enforcement of these

acts was the main reason for an improvement in the admiralty
system, but the increased capacity for prize adjudication
made necessary by the privateering flourishing during the
wars of William and Mary was an added bonus.

Unfortunately,

while Americans made great use of the admiralty system

and

reaped the benefits of the prize courts, the attempt to
enforce stricter trade regulations through the admiralty
courts was resented.
extension of

By the Revolution it was seen as an

"a jurisdiction foreign to our

constitution.
The 1696 Navigation Act for "Preventing Frauds,

and

Regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade" was aimed at
tightening the regulations which were being abused at the
cost of the English government.

Foreign vessels were

restricted in their participation in colonial trade,
English-built vessels had to be used to carry goods into or
out of the colonies, customs officers were entitled to use
writs of assistance to search vessels suspected of
violations of trade regulations,

and captains had to post

bonds to insure that their papers were genuine.

The act was

contradictory in specifying the jurisdiction of courts.

One

clause stated that offenses could be reviewed in the
admiralty where the violation occurred, while another
explicitly required trial by jury.
all admiralty courts at the time.

This would have excluded
The official
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interpretation of the act was to allow concurrent
jurisdiction in vice-admiralty courts and common law courts
at the choice of the plaintiff.

Admiralty courts thus were

given instance jurisdiction (which was over civil or
commercial cases) including seamen's wages, bottomry bonds,
charter parties,

salvage of wrecks,

and collision,

as well

as jurisdiction over enforcement of the Acts of Trade.
Under the new law, a special commission from the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty empowered the vice-admiralty
courts to hear prize cases in wartime.1^
Further evidence of the overriding concern of the
British government with increasing its income by tightening
controls over the colonial trade system is found in a July
6, 1704 communication from the queen to Virginia's governor
Francis Nicholson.

The letter cautions him to be careful

that prize goods not be hidden or embezzled from the crown.
Complaints of abuses of the colonial admiralty courts had
been received by the government,

and the precaution of

assigning special prize officers to vessels awaiting
condemnation or sale was to be taken to prevent any portion
of the ship or its cargo from being removed.

A general lack

of confidence that the officers of the courts had only the
interests of the royal treasury at heart was implicit.

20

In addition to the royal droit, the tariffs applicable
to prize goods in accordance with the new trade laws came to
as much as half that assessed against imported foreign
merchandise.

By 1708, government charges could total 60

33
percent of a prize's value.
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It is no wonder that the

government worried about embezzlement at a time when
privateers' profits were being so sharply cut.
Admiralty judges were not salaried until after 1708.
They did, however, completely control the admiralty courts.
They could schedule cases for early trial or wait if they
thought their fees could be enhanced.

Because high legal

fees could be an inducement to dispose of a prize illegally,
judges often made it a practice to

partially remit their

fees in order to draw a larger number of prizes to their
particular port.

22

With this sort of competition between

admiralty courts the judges were not getting wealthy from
their benches.

Many continued the private practice of law;

Peyton Randolph of Virginia was attorney general as well as
vice-admiralty judge.

23

With the outbreak of Queen Anne's War in 1708, the
economic forces swung away from high fees and droits and
toward the promotion of privateering.

24

The "Act for the

Encouragement of Trade to America" waived the royal droit
and eased regulation of privateering by empowering colonial
governors to issue letters of marque, and specifically
giving prize jurisdiction to colonial vice-admiralty
courts.

25

The appeal process was modified so that a select

group of privy councilors, the Lords Commissioners for Prize
Appeals, was created to render final decision, rather than
the king-in-council or the High Court of the Admiralty,
had been the practice. The statute also outlined trial

as
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procedures for use in prize cases which differed from other
cases - a realization of the difficulty of finding lawyers
(not to mention judges) with any experience in such a
peculiar area of the law.

26

By the beginning of King William's War the regulations
of 1708 had lapsed, and new legislation continued to waive
the royal droit.

27

In addition,

the crown, wishing to

tighten control over the smaller privateers who more easily
avoided regulation, voided the commissions of all raiders of
less than 100 tons or carrying fewer than ten three-pound
guns or fewer than forty crewmen.

The first salary for

judges was instituted at £200 per year in peacetime,

to be

paid from the royal droit on salvage or the sale of old
naval stores.

28

High costs of administration of admiralty

justice were cited when the officers of the Virginia court
were reminded in 1715 to comply with the new law and not
exact a fee of more than £10 from each prize condemned.

29

Excepting minor changes, the colonial vice-admiralty
administration remained in the same form through 1763.
that time there were eleven courts in North America,
same number as at the turn of the century.

At

the

Vice-admiralty

courts were located in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia,
Massachusetts,

Rhode Island, New York, Maryland,

Pennsylvania, Virginia,
Carolina.
pleased,

Georgia, and North and South

The courts could convene wherever the judge
and deputies were often appointed (and paid with a

percentage of the judge's fees) to take the courts to
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isolated areas.

Besides the judges (who were political

appointees of the governor), the officers of the court
consisted of the registers, who were the court clerks and
kept records and issued citations and orders, and the
marshals, who served processes and took custody of goods or
people and executed decrees.

Marshals and registers were

also appointed by the governors, except in Maryland and
North Carolina, where the judges appointed them themselves.
By the end of the Seven Years' War virtually all colonial
vice-admiralty court officers, including judges, were
provincial-born.^
The jurisdiction of the courts was threefold.

Their

original function in England was to settle disagreements
over seamen's wages and problems between merchants and
seamen or officers and crew.

These, along with cases of

shipwreck and salvage, charters, bottomry, and collisions at
sea, remained the most numerous in the colonial courts.

The

second area of jurisdiction was added by the 1696 navigation
laws and involved the enforcement of earlier laws and the
prosecution of offenders.

About one-third of all colonial

vice-admiralty court cases from 170 2 to 1763 were prize
• 4
.•
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cases in
time
of
A prize case was initiated by the party making the
capture, who filed a declaration or "libel" (indictment)
with the court against the prize vessel, which included a
stylized "complaint" and a prayer to the court for relief.
The judge then ordered the marshal of the court to take
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custody of the vessel and/or cargo and to give public notice
of this action.

This usually meant a short advertisement in

the local newspaper.

A proclamation stating the complaint

was issued by the judge and repeated at the following
session of the court.

At the second reading of the

proclamation the claimant or respondent filed his answer to
the libel.
answer.

He was allowed three sessions to appear and

If the respondent did not answer the libel, a

decree or judgement by default was issued.

If answer was

filed, the issue was joined and a trial proceeded.
parties were required to stipulate securities
they would appear for trial.

Both

(bonds) that

The opposing proctors

(lawyers) examined witnesses outside of court, testimony was
taken in writing in the form of answers to interrogation and
cross-interrogation.

At a further session of the court the

proctors presented the witnesses'
their arguments.

statements and recited

If more than one claim against the vessel

was pending or if any prior liens applied the court heard
them at this time.

The most important aspect of this

discovery phase, in terms of the court's determination of
fact, was the yielding of the prize's papers stating the
country of registry and the origin and destination of the
goods carried.

The judge delivered his decree based upon

this evidence, and the marshal then executed it.

The judge

could issue an interlocutory decree postponing his final
judgement until a later time, pending further disclosure.
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Prize appeals usually went to the Lords Commissioners
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for Prize Appeals.

Instance appeals (cases from the first

category of admiralty jurisdiction) went to the Privy
Council, but navigation act cases could go to either the
High Court of Admiralty or to the Privy Council.

Decrees

from the High Court of Admiralty could be carried on further
appeal to the Lords Commissioners, but a decision by the
king in (Privy) council was final. 3 3

Needless to say,

colonial judges were often confused as to where to send a
particular appeal.
The provincial judge executed the provisions of the
appeal decision, whatever body issued it.

If a libel was

successfully prosecuted, appraisers evaluated the vessel
and/or goods and the marshal sold them at public auction.
Any failure to meet a judgement (usually in a non-prize
case) meant fine, attachment, or imprisonment.^^
Over the half-century of colonial vice-admiralty court
jurisdiction, certain differences developed between the way
the law was perceived and enforced in England and in the
colonies.

These discrepancies arose as much out of the

conditions acting upon the courts and what they were
expected to accomplish as from the fact that American
barristers and judges had much less experience than their
English counterparts in the subleties of maritime law.
the American experience,

In

the admiralty courts had been given

steadily increasing power since 1696.

American

jurisprudence had also not benefitted from the power
struggle between the common law and the civil courts, which
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had resulted in the restriction in authority of the latter
in England.
The primacy of the common law was upheld in England by
the use of the writ of prohibition,

issued by the common law

court to stop proceedings in the civil admiralty court.
Colonial common law courts assumed this power over the
vice-admiralty courts but did not exercise it to the same
extent, resulting in its de facto abrogation.
officials,

Royal customs

realizing that American juries were reluctant to

condemn the property of their neighbors under what were seen
as onerous trade laws, began to exercise the clause in the
Navigation Act of 1696 granting the equal jurisdiction of
admiralty and common law courts in trade and revenue cases.
The choice of a non-jury court at the discretion of the
plaintiff allowed better enforcement of trade regulation,
but also increased American resentment of such taxation
without the representation of a jury of one's peers.

35

In addition to the legislative increase in admiralty
court power, practical factors tended to increase the use of
such courts at the expense of the common law.
speed of admiralty proceedings

The relative

(a common law court could

take up to six months to condemn a seizure), and the
advantages of the process i-n rem more than compensated for
the high cost of admiralty justice in all but the least
valuable cases where the percentage of fees charges was
prohibitive.

36

After the high percentage fees were repealed

during King William's War, admiralty court costs were

39
normally 2.5-3.5 percent of the prize value.

Additional

legal costs realized in the form of attorneys fees ran 1.5-2
percent.

The high number of captures declared unlawful, and

the resulting appeals were the major factors cutting into
privateering profits.

37

During King George's War

(1739-1748) the cost of admiralty justice was about 15
percent of the total value of all prizes taken.

For the

Seven Years' War the figure dropped to 10 percent.
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Because the judge's fee was set by law, he had an interest
in keeping total costs in his court low and in the timely
disposal of cases in order that his might be seen as a
favorable court to a privateer with a choice of ports to
which prizes could be sent.

The judge could thus increase

his fees through volume.
Legislation, rigid enforcement of the navigation acts,
the advantages of quick proceedings and the in rem process,
and the falling costs of admiralty courts all contributed to
a greater concentration of power in the colonial
vice-admiralty courts than in the English admiralty court
system.

The resulting abridgement of rights under the

common law as perceived by the Americans was not apparent to
the British who lived under the same laws and suffered no
such loss.
In fact, differences in procedural law in the colonial
courts served to increase American ambivalence.

Because

American lawyers and judges were virtually all
provincial-born and had no experience in English admiralty
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court procedure, certain practices evolved which had no
basis in the English system but which appeared when appeals
were carried to the high courts.

First, colonial courts

routinely admitted evidence of a questionable nature.

The

use of interrogatories which were prepared by the captors or
taken from persons not even aboard the vessel in question,
as well as the submission as evidence of papers not found on
the prize at the time of capture were fairly common
practices.

While there were no clear rules of evidence to

aid the judge in determining the facts in the face of
contradicting testimony or possible forgeries of ships
papers, American courts were less likely to declare a prize
illegal based on the questionable conduct or even obvious
forgeries of the captors.

In general, colonial

vice-admiralty courts used a system loosely based on a
combination of admiralty instance (non-prize) procedure and
common law m

deciding prize cases.

39

English courts clearly separated instance and prize
jurisdiction as set forth in the prize acts (specific laws
for their procedure enacted in 1708 and amended thereafter).
Prize jurisdiction was seen as specially granted in time of
war, with procedures which were entirely under control of
Parliament.

American judges and lawyers did not comprehend

the distinction; the same procedures were followed as in any
other vice-admiralty case.

40

The nature of this different

attitude to prize jurisdiction imparted a sense of
independence, of irresponsibility, to elected authority in
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the vice-admiralty courts which added fuel to American
dissatisfaction with British rule.
British attempts at rebuilding

the treasury through

various trade acts at the end of the Seven Years War were
accompanied by modifications in the vice-admiralty system
aimed at

increasing the efficiency of customs collection.

In 1764 the earl of Northumberland was created "Vice Admiral
over All America."

William Spry was appointed judge of a

court convened in Halifax and was given jurisdiction over
all America.

This is somewhat confusing because the court

was co-equal in jurisdiction with the provincial courts and
had no appellate jurisdiction.

S p r y 's annual salary of £800

paid from fees from condemned seizures was protested by
colonial merchants, who argued that he would always condemn
seizures as legal prizes in order to insure his wages.
Provision was made for the payment of S p r y 's salary out of
admiralty reserves if his condemnations were insufficient.
Moreover, provincial vice-admiralty judges had always
depended on their own actions in condemnations as the only
source of their income.

The new court at least made an

attempt to remove any conflict of interest.

Colonial

protests really stemmed from the fact that the new court was
created in order to try the unpopular new trade laws, which
in England were tried in common-law Exchequer courts with
juries.41
In 1768 the Halifax court was deemed too remote from
most of the colonies and was replaced by district courts in

42
Boston,

Philadelphia,

Charleston, and a new one in Halifax,

each with a regional jurisdiction.

These courts were also

to supplement the provincial courts, but were also given
appellate power over them.
per year.
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The judges'

salaries were £600

. . .
This was the last major modification of the

colonial vice-admiralty system before the Revolution.
The irony of the American experience with the
vice-admiralty courts was that the colonists needed them and
used them to their great advantage in trying prize cases,

at

the same time they were decrying them as unconstitutional
and tyrannical.
the courts.

The Americans ha d four main objections to

The judges'

salaries were seen to be exorbitant

and the method of payment conducive to conflict of interest.
For the most part, however,

the vice-admiralty judges were

men of integrity, and salaries were fixed to end economic
temptations.

Colonists were concerned that many judges

received their appointments as reward for loyalty during the
Stamp Act crisis.
legislation,

This was, on the whole,

a reaction to the

for the judges proved competent and tended to

stay above the conflict.

The British were accused of

extending the jurisdiction of the courts beyond traditional
limits in enforcing imperial trade and navigation laws.
While it is true that trade laws such as the Revenue Act of
1764 and the Townshend Acts allowed prosecution in
vice-admiralty courts,

the most onerous Stamp Act did not.

The heart of the dispute was the alleged denial of the right
of trial by jury.

Non-jury vice-admiralty courts never had
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sole jurisdiction under the law.

However, when colonial

trade officials realized that juries would not bring in
verdicts against their neighbors, the vice-admiralty courts
had sole jurisdiction m

practice.
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Before the Continental Congress declared independence
from England, the international legal implications of
fitting out privateers was weighed.

Because the granting of

commissions was the preserve of a sovereign state, such an
act could be construed as one of independence.

Those in the

Congress who were not yet ready to take that step toward a
complete break opposed privateering commissions.

44

By the

fall of 17 75, however, Washington had warships which were
capturing prizes.

He wrote to Congress urging the

establishment of admiralty courts to dispose of these
seizures.

45

Congress ordered research on the subject and

the first report on privateering
on November 25, 1775.

was placed before the body

This paper advocated a halfway

measure of legalizing the capture of warships,

troop

transports, and vessels carrying arms and ammunition, and
recommended that the individual colonies set up prize
4.
courts.

4 6

In December 1775 Virginia commissioned John Blair,
James Holt, and Edmund Randolph as judges of prize cases.
At least two of the three could convene a court with
jurisdiction over "all matters relating to vessels and their
cargoes."

Provision was made for fining witnesses who did

not appear fifty shillings.

Appeals were to be heard by the
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state committee of safety upon receipt of a bond of £20
securing the due prosecution of the appeal within thirty
days.

The judges'

salaries were set at twenty-five

shillings per day while the court was in session.

47

After the British "Prohibitory Act" forbade all trade
with the colonies, Congress passed a much stronger resolve
on March 23, 1776, which declared all British vessels fair
game.

48

The British, realizing that any acceptance of the

legality of American privateers meant recognition of the
rights of Congress as government of a sovereign nation,
referred to them as pirates and shipped their prisoners to
England to be tried as such.

49

Congress left the issuing of commissions to the
individual colonies, but printed up blank commission forms
with the names of the owners, commander, vessel,

type,

tonnage, number of guns, and crew to be filled in.

50

On

April 3, 1776 Congress issued its "Instructions to the
Commanders of private Ships or Vessels of W a r , " which was
intended,

given the British propaganda,

to draw as great a

distinction as possible between American privateers and
piracy for the world at large.

Paragraph IV stipulated that

all legal interrogatories and documents be delivered to the
proper court.

Paragraph V insured that a captured vessel be

kept intact until condemnation, while paragraph VI
prohibited torture of prisoners,

and paragraph IX insured

against the piratical practice of the ransoming of prisoners
at sea (thus avoiding taking any vessels to court). 51
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Later, American privateers were required to pay the captured
crew's normal wages out of the prize money distribution,

and

commanders were made liable to the owners of captured
vessels in case of damages incurred during
upheld m

court.

52

seizures not

A $5,000 bond was required by all

privateers up to 100 tons burthen,

$10,000 if larger, to

insure compliance with these regulations.

In May 1780 the

bond was increased to $20,000. 5 3
Congress also left the administration of admiralty
justice to the individual colonies.

In reaction to the

vice-admiralty courts' violation of the right to jury trial,
however, Congress instructed each colony to institute jury
trials in prize proceedings.

In May 1776 the Virginia

assembly upheld Congress' April 3rd resolution by appointing
a new admiralty court, requiring trial by a jury of
freeholders.

James Hubard, Joseph Prentis,

were appointed judges.

and John Tyler

Again, any two could convene a

. 54
c ourt.
In the April 3rd resolution, Congress decreed that it
would hear all appeals in general session.

The first of

these appeals was heard on August 5, 1776, and was so
complex and time-consuming that Congress referred the matter
to special committee.

A standing committee for appeals was

established the next year.
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In October 1776 Virginia enacted Thomas Jefferson's
"Act for establishing a Court of Admiralty."

This third

version kept to the three-judge format, but they were now to

46
be chosen by joint ballot of both houses of the assembly.
This court was to be governed by "the regulations of the
Continental Congress, the acts of the Virginia general
assembly, English statutes prior to the fourth year of the
reign of James I, and the laws of Oleron, and the Rhodian
and Imperial laws so far as they have been observed in the
English courts of admiralty."
The judges were to appoint an advocate for the state, a
register, and a marshal.

Court procedure called for a libel

to be filed, and if the owner of the prize vessel could not
be found, an advertisement was to be published in the
Virginia Gazette for three weeks.

If no owner appeared (it

was not likely that any British merchant ship owners would),
the libel was accepted as confessed and the court condemned
the vessel.

A decree of the court's findings was also

published in the Gazette for three weeks, but if the prize's
owner appeared within one year his defense would still be
heard.

The Virginia law allowed for the fees of the

register and marshal to be set by the court.

If the

libellant desired, the marshal was authorized to order the
sale of the condemned vessel at auction.

Congressional

jurisdiction of appeal was also upheld.
All matters of fact were tried by jury, except in cases
of capture from an enemy, which were tried by the court or
jury as Congress directed.

The distinction thus finally

began to be made in an American admiralty court between
instance and prize practice.

The rights of the individual

47
in non-prize cases were protected by jury trial, but British
prizes were not automatically afforded the same safeguard.
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Prize law was so complex and the facts often so unclear
that the jury trial system proved disastrous in the few
months following its inception in May 1776.

Local juries

were commonly overruled by the appeals committee because
they had no knowledge of sea law or custom.
court was only a partial remedy,

57

The October

for in May 1779 the law was

again changed to call for jury trial only when both parties
were citizens of Virginia.

58

The problem of keeping soldiers and sailors in the
service of the Continental and Virginia army and navy was
approached in two ways.

On February 6, 1777 Virginia

conformed to the regulations of Congress in reducing its
droit in the capture of English merchant vessels by naval
ships to one-half of their value.

The entire value of

captured British warships went to the the crew of the
captor.

This provided some incentive for the regular navy

seamen, since it was comparable to the privateers whose
crews received the

whole value of any prize taken.

58

In

October of the same year Virginia state naval crews also
received the whole value of any prize taken.

59

In May 1780

Virginia dealt with the problem of army deserters by
witholding prize money and a £500 fine from any privateer
with deserters in its c r e w . ^
As seen in the retreat from the use of juries,
instructions from the Congress were not always carried out
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by the states.

In May 1781 Virginia authorized the Congress

to levy a duty of 5 percent on certain goods including prize
goods and prizes.

By November Virginia legislators realized

that several other states had not enacted the law and
decided to suspend it pending such enactment.

In 1782

letters of complaint were sent to the governors of
Massachusetts,

Rhode Island,

and Maryland which cited the

growing public debt and asked why they did not comply with
the law.

Apparently,

no answer was received; Virginia

finally repealed the law, claiming that it was injurious to
4-4- sovereignty.
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state
A Pennsylvania admiralty court judge, George Ross,
proved particularly recalcitrant in dealing with the
Continental Congress.

A

complex case came before him in

1777 in which he awarded a one-fourth share in a prize to
captain Gideon Olmsted and his crew of the sloop Active

(who

actually captured the vessel) and three-fourths to two ships
who were in sight at the time.

This was common in admiralty

practice at the time because the ships not actually engaged
would still presumably weigh in the decision of the captain
of the prize to surrender.
Congress, however,

and was awarded the whole value of the

prize in December 1778.
the prize money,

Olmsted appealed his case to

Judge Ross refused to distribute

stating "Congress had no right to try a

case settled by the court of admiralty of Pennsylvania."
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A thirty-year battle began involving states rights and the
creation of the first federal court in 1779.

Congress

49
provided for a three judge court of appeals, the first such
federal court, to hear such complex,

inter-state cases and

those not satisfied by the state courts' decisions.

64

The

system proved quite satisfactory for of the thousands of
admiralty cases heard in the state courts, only 114 were
appealed.
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By the end of this court's life m

1786

federalism was more secure, but Olmsted did not receive his
prize money until 1 8 0 9 . ^

CONCLUSION
By the eighteenth century, the period when privateers
from the Chesapeake Bay region were becoming active, the
great age of privateering was long past.

Hawkins and Drake

had plundered the Spanish Main in the 1560s and 1570s, and
Henry Morgan capped his career with the sack of Panama in
1671.

Chesapeake privateers could hold no hope of being

made admiral of the fleet, or of retiring in knighthood to a
Jamaican plantation.

Military and naval forces operating in

the Chesapeake privateers 1 waters had become too strong to
allow for the bold successes of earlier times.

Improved

laws and regulations governing the "letters of marque"
restricted adventuring for personal profit.
Some of the conditions which made the earlier Caribbean
privateering so profitable were still prevalent in the
eighteenth century, however.

Colonial settlements were

still distant from the mother countries,
shipments of goods over long sea routes.

requiring large
Sail-powered naval

forces, while able to make life much more difficult for
privateers, were as yet too slow and thinly distributed to
protect all commercial shipping.

The growing wealth of the

colonies increased the value of the prizes, and continuing
conflicts provided the opportunity to be legally
commissioned to attack the enemy's shipping.
50
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As before, merchant seaman traded their relatively safe
positions for the promise of many times their normal pay
during a voyage, while poor landsmen suffering increased
hardships during the frequent wars flocked to the
privateers.

The permanence and scope of the social changes

brought about by this exodus have yet to be studied.
The opportunity for these men to share in the prize
wealth depended upon the owners and financiers of the
privateer vessels, and with the latter group's motivation
lies the great difference in the two eras of privateering.
Chesapeake privateer owners were almost invariably merchants
who were put out of business by naval blockade or enemy
privateers.

This defensive response to adverse economic

conditions was not exhibited by the earlier generations who
were basically opportunists and adventurers.

While the

earlier privateers brought great wealth to their patrons,
especially in the Elizabethan era, the smaller returns of
the Chesapeake privateers were more crucial to the survival
of that region's fragile, isolated economy.
On the surface, the regulation of privateering and
prize courts in America seems firmly grounded in the English
legislation, precedent, and custom which had been evolving
before Drake's time.

The unique conditions and requirements

of admiralty jurisdiction in America, however, produced a
system quite different from that in England.

The fact that

neither colony nor mother country recognized the differences
accounted for much of the tension derived from the
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Americans' perceptions of the abuse of their rights.
Attempts to avoid the abuses seen as inherent in the English
admiralty system through the grafting of common law jury
trial onto admiralty courts proved abortive.

Largely

because of the privateers' need for prize courts and
specialized admiralty laws and procedures, Americans found
themselves ultimately instituting the type of system which
they had so vehemently fought as a tyrannical extension of
imperial power.
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